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VOICE, STRENGTH, AND NO-CONTEST CLAUSES
KARENJ.SNEDDON*

[H]is will was read, and like almost every other will, gave as
much disappointment as pleasure.
-Jane Austen'
The will is a unilateral written disposition of probate property to be
effective upon the will-maker's death. To have any legal effect, however,
the will-maker's family, beneficiaries, and personal representatives, along
with the probate court, need to implement the will provisions. To buttress
the strength of the will, the language of the will is definitive, certain, and
strong. But when the will relies upon standardized language, the voice of
the will-maker is flattened or even non-existent. The absence of the willmaker's voice may jeopardize the legal effect of the will.
This Article argues that the over-reliance on "time-tested" formulaic
language endows the will with a mechanical, masculine voice that is illfitting for most testators and does not advance the goals of testators.
Specifically, this Article will focus on the use and language of the nocontest clause. Will-makers and will-drafters have long abandoned the
language of in terrorem clauses that threaten eternal damnation for anyone
who seeks to alter the terms of the will. The replacement language uses
false strength to intimidate beneficiaries by referencing a potential forfeiture
of a testamentary gift. The standard no-contest clause has continuing appeal
to testators and drafters, despite concerns raised about the flattening of the
testator's voice and provocative nature of the language.
This Article argues that the value of the no-contest clause is
undermined by the generic, hollow language replicated in form no-contest
clauses. Rather than discouraging will contests, the language may actually
encourage will contests. To support this argument, this Article first sets the
concept of voice in the context of testamentary language. This Article next
examines the purpose, structure, appeal, and concerns of the no-contest
clause. Then, this Article reviews how courts, focusing particularly on
cases decided across the country within the last five years, have interpreted
the language in no-contest clauses. This Article concludes by emphasizing
how the reliance on "time-tested" formulaic language perpetuates
stereotypes, most specifically gender stereotypes, and inhibits drafting
innovation. After all, a will is more than a mere legal instrument that
transfers widgets and greenacres. The voice in the will should be authentic
and genuine.
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*
Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. I appreciated the
opportunity to be part of the 2018 Wisconsin Law Review Symposium "Wills, Trusts &
Estates Meets Race, Gender & Class." Thank you to the symposium organizers and
attendees.
1.
JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 4 (2006).
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INTRODUCTION

A will is more than a mere legal instrument that transfers widgets
and greenacres. To create a will, a person must reflect upon his or her
life's choices, tally his or her monetary value, and assess his or her
relationships with people and organizations. All of this planning is done
in the shadow of confronting mortality and contemplating a legacy.
This personal reflection and contemplation is reflected in a document
that often reads generic and inauthentic. For, despite the extensive selfreferencing, the language of a typical will bears little connection to a
personal voice of the testator. In striving to be substantively accurate
and legally operative, the drafter and form documents flatten the voice
of the document into a monotonous amalgamation of stock phrases and
standard provisions.
This Article argues that the reliance on "time-tested" formulaic
language endows the will with a mechanical, masculine voice that is illfitting for most testators and does not advance the goals of testators.
Specifically, this Article will focus on the use and language of the nocontest clause. This Article argues that the value of the no-contest
clause is undermined by the generic, hollow language replicated in
form no-contest clauses. Rather than discouraging will contests, the
language may actually encourage will contests. To support this
argument, this Article first sets the concept of voice in the context of
testamentary language. This Article next examines how the clause
operates, the appeal of the clause to both testators and drafters, and the
concerns raised by the standard no-contest clause. Then, this Article
reviews how courts, focusing particularly on cases decided within a five
year period, have interpreted no-contest clauses. This Article concludes
by emphasizing how the reliance on "time-tested" formulaic language
perpetuates stereotypes, most specifically gender stereotypes, and
inhibits drafting innovation.
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I. WILLS AND VOICE
Black's Law Dictionary defines a will as a "document by which a
person directs his or her estate to be distributed upon death. " 2 More
specifically, a will may be defined as a unilateral, revocable written
declaration of the disposition of probate property. 3 That description,
specifically the word "declaration," exposes the number of conditions
that must occur before a will has a legal effect. A will has legal effect if
all of the following seven events occur:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

the will is properly created
the will is not properly revoked
the will's existence is known to someone other than the
testator
the will is located after the testator's death within a set
period of time
the will, or what more accurately what purports to be the
will, is submitted to the relevant probate court
the purported will is admitted to the probate court as the
valid will
the testator dies owning probate property. 4

Even if all of these conditions occur, the language of the will may
not have the legal effect anticipated by its testator-at least not in its
entirety. The language of the will may be modified by the court upon a
construction proceeding. The personal representative has the ability to
settle claims made against the estate, which may operate to alter the
terms of the will. 5
To have any legal effect, however, the will-maker's family,
beneficiaries, and personal representatives, along with the probate
court, need to implement the provisions. Perhaps then the more
appropriate definition of will from Black's Law Dictionary is "[w]ish;
desire; choice. " 6 Essentially, the language of the will is a series of
requests that will hopefully be followed. This understanding can be
seen with the title sometimes attributed to the will: last wishes. To

2.
Will, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (second definition of the
term "will").
3.
Karen J. Sneddon, Speaking for the Dead: Voice in Last Wills and
Testaments, 85 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 683, 685 (2011).
4.
MARY F. RADFORD, REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA
§§ 3:1-3:3 (2017-2018 ed.).
5.
The proposed settlement may need to be approved by the probate court.
E.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE§ 3-1102 (amended 2010).
6.
Will, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004) (referencing the first
definition of the term "will" and placed in the context of "employment at will").
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buttress the strength of the provisions, the language of the will is
definitive, certain, and strong. But when the language relies upon
standardized language, the voice of the will-maker is missing. The
absence of the will-maker's voice may jeopardize the legal effect of the
will.
Conceptualizing the will as a series of wishes references the
concept of voice and provides a technique for the testator to persuade
the audience of the will to follow the wishes expressed in the will. All
communications, whether written or oral, have a voice. Voice is the
sound or sense of the speaker conveying the communications. 7 Peter
Elbow, renowned compos1t1on studies professor and scholar,
summarizes the effect of voice as follows: "Writing with voice is
writing into which someone has breathed. It has that fluency, rhythm,
and liveliness that exist naturally in the speech of most people when
they are enjoying a conversation. " 8 Aligning the language of the will
with the testator's own voice does not mean injecting precatory
language9 or ambiguous language. Aligning the voice of the will with
the testator's voice can be achieved by customizing the order of
provisions, personalizing the descriptions of tangible personal property,
using both full legal names and nicknames to identify beneficiaries, and
removing outdated legalese. 10
Voice becomes a technique to increase the persuasiveness of a
document. 11 Persuasion refers to influencing a person to undertake or
refrain from undertaking a particular action. 12 In the context of the will,
the language of the will aims to persuade the testator's family members,
beneficiaries, and personal representatives to follow the wishes as
7.
See, e.g., I. Christopher Rideout, Voice, Self, and Persona in Legal
Writing, 15 LEGAL WRITING 67, 68 (2009); Darsie Bowden, Voice, in CONCEPTS IN
COMPOSITION: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE TEACHING OF WRITING 285, 291-92 (Irene
L. Clark ed., 2003); DARSIE BOWDEN, THE MYTHOLOGY OF VOICE 61 (Charles I.
Schuster, ed., 1999); Kathleen Blake Yancey, Introduction: Definition, Intersection,
and Difference-Mapping the Landscape of Voice, in VOICES ON VOICE: PERSPECTIVES,
DEFINITIONS, INQUIRY vii, ix (Kathleen Blake Yancey, ed., 1994).
8·
PETER ELBOW, WRITING WITH POWER: TECHNIQUES FOR MASTERING THE
WRITING PROCESS 299 (1981). For an examination of judicial writing and voice, see
Andrea McArdle, Understanding Voice: Writing in a Ju.dicial Context, 20 LEGAL
WRITING 189 (2015).
9.
Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Sex, Language, and the Law of
Precatory Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (2007).
10.
Sneddon, supra note 3, at pt. III.B.
11.
See, e.g., Julius Getman, Voices, 66 TEx. L. REv. 577, 577, 582 (1988)
(exploring the concepts of "human voice" and "professional voice").
12.
For a survey of social science studies relating to persuasion and the
potential applicable to legal writing, see Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Science of
Persuasion: An Initial Exploration, 2006 MlcH. ST. L. R.Ev. 411. See also Kathryn
Stanchi, Persuasion: An Annotated Bibliography, 6 J. Ass'N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 75, 75-76 (2009) (creating a bibliography of persuasion and legal writing).
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outlined. Relatedly, the language aims to dissuade the disregarding of
those wishes.
The genuineness of the voice, the authenticity of the voice, and the
strength of the voice affects the purpose of the document. For instance,
voice affects how the audience engages with the document. Voice will
affect how the document is interpreted and ultimately, the document
legally operates. In the context of wills, voice offers the ability of the
testator to identify with the document. The will is phrased as a first
person narrative, but the testator may see little reflection of the
testator's perspective, concerns, and hopes in a document crammed
with stock phrasing. 13 Increasing the testator's ability to identify with
and to connect to the document promotes testator engagement. This
engagement encourages the testator to understand the legal and nonlegal implications of the terms. 14 This engagement can also encourage
the testator to share the terms with others-rather than "surprise"
family, friends, and the beneficiaries with the terms after death. 15 The
voice will influence how beneficiaries react to the document. Whether
the beneficiaries recognize the voice or not may affect the beneficiaries'
willingness and the willingness of the testator's family to follow the
instructions or to object to the terms of the will. How the court
interprets the will to determine intent1 6 will also be influenced by the
voice in the document. 17 The testator needs the beneficiaries, family
members, and the court to implement the terms to give the will its
intended legal effect.
Litigation involving a will is not uncommon. 18 According to one
scholar, "some 60 to 70 percent of all Roman civil litigation seems to

13.
See generally Deborah S. Gordon, Mor[t]ality and Identity: Wills,
Narratives, and Cherished Possessions, 28 YALEJ.L. & HUMAN. 265 (2016); Karen J.
Sneddon, The Will as Personal Narrative, 20 ELDER L.J. 355 (2013).
14.
See generally Sneddon, supra note 3.
15.
See, e.g., Louis S. Harrison, Defensive Strategies for Potential Will and
Trust Contests, PROB. & PROP. Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 6, 10 ("Will and trust challenge
cases often have one fact in common. The beneficiaries are surprised and angered over
the client's decision.").
16.
For an analysis of testamentary intent, see Mark Glover, A Taxonomy of
Testamentary Intent, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 569 (2016).
17.
"A will is authentic when the decedent intended it to be a legally effective
expression of her intended testamentary gifts. If a will is authentic, the court should
grant probate so that the decedent's intent is fulfilled . . . . " Mark Glover, ProbateError Costs, 49 CONN. L. REV. 613, 625 (2016).
18.
E.g., Leon Jaworski, The Will Contest, Address Delivered to American
College of Trial Lawyers (April 16, 1958), in 10 BAYLOR L. REV. 87, 88 (1958) ("It
has been said, and I think accurately, that a will is more apt to be the subject of
litigation than any other legal instrument. To say the least, it is an instrument frequently
made the subject of litigation.").
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have arisen over problems connected with succession on death." 19 That
litigation includes filings about nomination of fiduciaries, actions by the
fiduciaries, construction proceedings-and will contests. 20 Just how
many wills are contested is subject to debate. 21 While a will contest may
not occur with the frequency worried by testators, wills contests that do
occur are messy and costly. 22 Other types of litigation related to the
will, such as construction proceedings, may be much more common
than the will contest. Nonetheless, drafters need to anticipate what
litigation may arise and how to resolve those issues without disrupting a
testator's estate plan. 23 The no-contest clause is one option for the
drafter and the testator to consider. But the clause will not necessarily
address the problem. As was spoken by Henry W. Taft in a 1921
address to the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, "Even
the aid of legal skill of the highest order cannot give [the testator] the
consolation that his [or her] memory will not be marred by unseemly
disclosure of his [or her] foibles and weaknesses. " 24
II. NO-CONTEST CLAUSES
No-contest clauses are also referred to as in te"orem clauses. 25
The term "in te"orem" is Latin for the phrase "in order to frighten. "26
19.
EDWARD CHAMPLIN, FINAL JUDGMENT: DUTY AND EMOTION IN ROMAN
WILLS, 200 B.C.-A.D. 250 7 (Univ. of Cal. Press ed., 1991).
20.
For a detailed presentation of the mechanics of filing a will contest, see
Joyce Moore, Will Contests: From Start to Finish, 44 ST. MARY'S L.J. 97 (2012).
21.
E.g., John H. Langbein, Will Contests, 103 YALE L.J. 2039, 2042 n.5
(1994) (asserting that with millions of wills probated, only one in one hundred is
contested). An empirical study analyzed probate records in one county in Tennessee
from 1976 to 1984. Jeffrey A. Schoenblum, Will Contests-An Empirical Study, 22 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 607, 608 (1987). The study concluded that "the likelihood of any
will being contested is extremely attenuated." Id. at 615. The study's author posited
that will contests occurred "perhaps on the order of one in one hundred or so cases."
Id. at 614.
22.
The concern about delay in the settlement of the estate and the expense of
litigation can encourage the settlement of will contests. As one hornbook warns, this
concern "may force a settlement even when a contest has no merit." WILLIAM M.
McGovERN, SHELDON F. KURTZ, & DAVID M. ENGLISH, WILLS, TRUSTS AND EsTATES
INCLUDING TAXATION AND FUTURE INTERESTS 643 (4th ed. 2010).
23.
For a summary of thirteen recommendations for estate planners when a
will contest or trust litigation is anticipated, see Elaine M. Bucher, Michael D. Simon,
& Alyse M. Reiser, The Best Defense is a Good Offense, TR. & EsT., Mar. 2013, at
17, 18-21.
24.
Henry W. Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York, Address
delivered at a meeting of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Jan. 13,
1921), in 30 YALE L.J. 593, 606 (1921).
25.
Historically, there appears to have been a distinction between an in
terrorem clause, which was solely a threat, and a no-contest clause, which provided for
the forfeiture of a contesting party's testamentary gift. George A. Slater, In Tellorem
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This Latin translation emphasizes one of the goals of the clause: to
frighten away a potential will contest. 27 The no-contest clause is also
described as a forfeiture clause or a penalty clause. 28 These terms
reference how the clause will frighten a beneficiary. If a beneficiary
contests the validity of any portion of the will, the clause provides that
the beneficiary shall forfeit his or her testamentary gift. If the will
contest is successful and the purported will is not admitted to probate,
the clause will have no legal effect. 29 The beneficiary would then take a
testamentary gift under a prior properly executed will or receive an
intestate share via the applicable state intestate statute.
The clause thus operates to put pressure on the beneficiary's
decision to contest the will in order to potentially receive a higher gift
than provided for in the will-or lose the testamentary gift entirely. As
one author states,
the clause operates as a settlement offer from the testator to a
beneficiary of a lesser benefit than the amount the beneficiary
would receive under the state intestacy scheme. This offer is
made in the hope that the disappointed beneficiary will accept
the smaller benefit, rather than risk an all-or-nothing gamble
by contesting probate. 30
The no-contest clause should not be confused with the statement of
disinheritance. 31 Although similar, strong language may be used in both
provisions, the purposes of the two provisions are different. The
statement of disinheritance is a recitation of individuals who are not
receiving any gifts under the will or who are given nominal gifts, such
as gifts of one dollar. The following is an example from a recent case:

Clauses in Wills, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1936); see also Peter G. Lawson, The Rule
Against "In Terrorem" Conditions: What Is It? Where Did It Come from? Do We Really
Need It?, 25 EsT. TR. & PENSIONS J. 71 (2006); W. Harry Jack, No-Contest or In
Te"orem Clauses in Wills-Construction and Enforcement, 19 Sw. L.J. 722, 722-23
(1965).
26.
In Te"orem, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
27.
No-contest clauses may also be referred to as noncontest clauses or
anticontest clauses. No-Contest Clauses, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
28.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-517 (amended 2010).
29.
JEFFREY N. PENNELL & ALAN NEWMAN, ESTATE AND TRUST PLANNING 62
(ABA 2005).
30.
Dawn Koren, Note, No-Contest Clauses: Settlement Offers from the
Grave, 12 PROB. L.J. 173, 173 (1995).
31.
A negative will should be considered a statement of disinheritance. See
Frederic S. Schwartz, Models of the Will and Negative Disinheritance, 48 MERCER L.
REV. 1137, 1137 (1997).
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"I leave my son, Paul, my love and affection but nothing more knowing
that he is financially able to care for himself and his family. " 32
One of the main purposes of a statement of disinheritance is to
clarify that the testator did not unintentionally omit the named
individuals. 33 This prevents the individual from claiming a pretermitted
heir's share. 34 A statement of disinheritance may sometimes include a
reason why a particular family member is not receiving a testamentary
gift, such as the creation and funding of a lifetime trust for the
identified individual. 35 Because the identified individual is not receiving
a gift under the terms of the will or receiving only a nominal gift, the
individual is not dissuaded from filing a contest for threat of losing a
testamentary gift. Instead, the personal representatives and the court
have a memorialization of the testator's intent to purposely exclude the
named individuals.
Historically, no-contest clauses centered on a threat to invoke
terror in the beneficiary. The following is a typical example from an
Anglo-Saxon will. 36
And he who shall detract from my will which I have now
declared in witness of God, may he be deprived of joy on this
earth, and may the Almighty Lord who created and made all
creatures exclude him from the fellowship of all saints on the
Day of Judgment, and may he be delivered into the abyss of
hell to Satan the devil and all his accursed companions and

32.
In re Estate of Grutzner, 46 Misc. 3d 1228(A) (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 2015).
The 1993 instrument also included "an in terrorem clause." The instrument gave all the
property to an individual who predeceased the testator. Thus, the testator's property
passed via intestacy with the statement of disinheritance about Paul acting as a negative
will. The probate property was distributed as though Paul predeceased the testator. Id.
33.
See PENNELL, supra note 29, at 216.
34.
For an analysis of protections for pretermitted children, see generally
Adam J. Hirsch, Airbrushed Heirs: The Problem of Children Omitted from Wills, 50
REAL PROP. TR.. & EsT. L.J. 175 (2015).
35.
For an analysis of the fictional will of Henry Seth Hubbard from John
Grisham's "Sycamore Row," see Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, The Rhetoric of Race,
Redemption, and Will Contests: Inheritance as Reparations in John Grisham's
Sycamore Row, 48 U. MEM. L. REv. 889, 948-50 (2018).
36.
For purposes of this Article, the term "will" is used to refer to the deathbed dispositions of property during Anglo-Saxon times. Such "wills" were not
ambulatory. See generally Brenda Danet & Bryna Bogoch, From Oral Ceremony to
Written Document: The Transitional Language of Anglo-Saxon Wills, 12 LANGUAGE &
COMM., Apr. 1992, at 98 (analyzing sixty-two Old English Wills, including the wills in
the collection edited by Dorothy Whitelock).
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there suffer with God's adversaries, without end, and never
trouble my heirs. 37
Many commentators trace the modem analysis of no-contest
clauses to the 1846 English case of Cooke v. Tumer. 38 The validity of
no-contest clauses was then considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in
1898 in Smithsonian Institution v. Meech. 39 No-contest clauses received
much attention in the late 1950s40 and 1960s. 41 Part of this mid-century
attention may be attributed to the energy derived from the drafting
process of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code. 42 Part of this attention may
also be attributed to the recognition by legal academics, practitioners,
and judges that the base of testation43 was expanding. More potential
testators had more property to pass-some of which would be passed by

37.
DOROTHY WHITELOCK, Will of Wulfgyth, in ANGLO-SAXON WILLS 87
(AMS Press Inc. New York 1973) (originally published in 1930).
38.
Robert E. Kuelthau, Wills: Validity of No-Contest Clauses in Wills, 43
MARQ. L. REv. 528, 529 (1960) (referencing Cooke v. Turner, 15 M. & W. 727, 153
Eng. Rep. 1044 (1846)).
39.
169 U.S. 398, 411-14 (1898). The relevant testamentary language is as
follows:
I bequeath to the sister and brothers of my late wife one thousand dollars
(1000) to be equally divided between them. I have already given these last
over a thousand dollars which my wife inherited from her father, also
clothing and other gifts, thus equalizing substantially my gifts to her family
and to mine. These bequests are all made upon the condition that the
legatees acquiesce in this will, and I hereby bequeath the share or shares of
any disputing this will to the residuary legatee hereinafter named.
Id. at 399.
The English case of Cooke v. Turner is cited by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at
413-14. For an analysis of both Cooke and Smithsonian, see Jack, supra note 25, at
723-25.
40.
E.g., Jaworski, supra note 18, at 88; Comment, No-Contest Will
Clauses, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 762, 762-63 (1957); Note, Will Contests on Trial, 6
STAN. L. REV. 91 (1953).
41.
See, e.g., Jack, supra note 25; see also Hugo M. Pfaltz, Jr., "In
Te"orem" Ne Te"eamus, 52 KY. L.J. 769 (1964); Herman F. Selvin, Comment,
Te"or in Probate, 16 STAN. L. REv. 355 (1964); Jack Leavitt, Scope and Effectiveness
of No-Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testaments, 15 HASTINGS L.J. 45 (1963);
Robert C. Reed, Note, No-Contest Clauses in Wills, 23 U. PITT. L. REv. 767 (1962).
42.
For an examination of the 1969 Uniform Probate Code and the reform
movement, see Richard V. Wellman, Lawyers and the Uniform Probate Code, 26
OKLA. L. REv. 548, 550-51 (1973); Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform Probate Code:
Blueprint for Reform in the 70's, 2 CONN. L. REY. 453, 503-04 (1970); Richard V.
Wellman, The Lawyer's Stake in Probate Reform, 47 MICH. ST. B.J. 10 (1968),
reprinted in 9 L. OFF. EcON. & MGMT. 415 (1969); Richard V. Wellman, The Uniform
Probate Code: A Possible Answer to Probate Avoidance, 44 IND. L.J. 191, 194 (1969).
43.
See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Testacy and Intestacy: The Dynamics of
Wills and Demographic Status, 23 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 36, 41-42, 53 (2009).
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testamentary instruments. 44 More lawyers with varied experiences were
drafting more wills. 45 The expansion may have promoted the reexamination of standard forms and standard language as they proved to
be inadequate.
Inclusion of the no-contest clause is known to present at least some
risk because the clause, as stated in a 2013 practitioner focused article,
"can backfire. " 46 The no-contest clause is, for that reason, not routinely
included in every will that is drafted. 47 The clause is typically included
when the testator or the drafter, as the case may be, anticipates that a
will contest may be filed. 48 The clause's inclusion may in fact prompt a
will contest by acknowledging that the testator or the drafter recognized
the possibility that a will contest might be filed. This may inspire the
beneficiaries or heirs, as the case may be, to file a will contest.
A. How the Clause Operates

The message conveyed in no-contest clauses can be stated as
follows: "you get what you get and you don't get upset." The testator
has provided for the testator's family, friends, and organizations in a
manner that the testator has determined to be appropriate. The family,
friends, and organizations should thus respect the testator's decisions
without complaint.
Because testamentary freedom is the touchstone in American
succession, 49 the testator should have the ability to determine who or
what receives his or her property. 50 That includes the ability to provide
that no property goes to the testator's family members. Testamentary
freedom is by no means a universally held tenet of succession. Many
countries have systems of succession built upon forced succession
where particular shares are statutorily proscribed to individuals with

44.
See, e.g., Sumner Kenner, Non-Contesting Clauses in Wills, 3 IND. L.J.
269, 270 (1928) (positing that client demand was the cause for "more non-contesting
clauses inserted in wills written today than ever before").
45.
See id.
46.
Bucher, Simon, & Reiser, supra note 23, at 21.
47.
See, e.g., Peter M. Tiersma, Some Myths About Legal Language, 2 L.,
CULTURE & HUMAN. 29, 38 (2006) (criticizing the routine inclusion of no-contest
clauses in wills). But see Adam F. Streisand & Albert G. Handelman, No Contests
Need to Be Reformed, Not Abolished, 10 CAL. TR. & EsT. Q., no. 3, at 27 (Fall 2004)
("It has become commonplace for estate planners to include a no contest clause in a will
or trust to stem the ever increasing tide of internecine warfare.").
48.
See Koren, supra note 30.
49.
See, e.g., Ashbel G. Gulliver & Catherine J. Tilson, Classifications of
Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1941).
50.
See generally Mark Glover, Freedom of Inheritance, 2017 UTAH L. REv.
283.
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certain legal relationships to the testator. 51 If testamentary freedom is
the relevant touchstone, the will should be reflective of the testator's
choices. This would mean that no-contest clauses clause should be
enforceable "where it is clear that the trustor (or testator) intended that
the conduct in question should forfeit a beneficiary's interest under the
indenture (or will). " 52
Yet, automatically enforcing all no-contest clauses would
undermine testamentary freedom by stifling legitimate will contests. 53 In
the event that the will does not reflect the choices of the testator, the
will should be considered invalid. For those reasons, the grounds for a
will contest preserve testamentary freedom. Many jurisdictions have
recognized an exception to the enforceability of the no-contest clauses
to permit the filing of legitimate will contests. 54 If the contest is brought
in good faith with probable cause, the terms of the no-contest clause
will have no legal effect. 55 As one court observed in 2015, "A goodfaith and probable-cause exception to the enforceability of forfeiture
clauses in wills is in keeping with the guaranty of all citizens of this
state to seek redress for their grievances through due process of law. " 56
The law "abhors forfeiture. " 57 As forfeiture clauses, no-contest
clauses will be strictly construed. 58 Some jurisdictions will never

51.
E.g., Ryan McLearen, Comment, International Forced Heirship:
Concerns and Issues with European Forced Heirship Claims, 3 EsT. PLAN. &
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 323, 323-28 (2011).
52.
Cox v. Fisher, 322 S.W.2d 910, 914 (Mo. 1959); see also Leavitt, supra
note 41, at 64 ("While the wisdom of inserting a forfeiture clause may be open to
question, the law does not require that the testamentary distribution be wise or even
equitable provided that the testator has clearly expressed his [or her] intention.").
53.
See, e.g., Estate of Stewan, 286 P.3d 1089 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012)
(considering whether to invalidated a no-contest clause).
54.
The most widely recognized exception is the "good faith with probable
cause" exception, but other exceptions are recognized by jurisdictions. For example, a
jurisdiction may have an exception that permits a beneficiary who is a minor at the time
of the testator's death to contest the will without triggering the no-contest clause. E.g.,
N.Y. § 3-3.5(b) (McKinney 2018); IND. CODE§ 29-1-6-2.
55.
The Restatement also endorses a good faith-probable cause exception.
REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.5 ("A
provision in a donative document purporting to rescind a donative transfer to, or a
fiduciary appointment of, any person who institutes a proceeding challenging the
validity of all or part of the donative document is enforceable unless probable cause
existed for instituting the proceeding."). As one scholar explained the need for a good
faith-probable cause exception, "respect for the dead must give way to the rights of the
living." Selvin, supra note 41, at 365.
56.
Parker v. Benoist, 160 So. 2d 198, 206 (Miss. 2015). But see Sharp v.
Sharp, 447 S.W.3d 622, 626 (Ark. Ct. App. 2014) ("Simply put, Arkansas law does
not provide for a good-faith exception for a litigant who files what unquestionably
constitutes a will contest.").
57.
See, e.g., Clark v. Bentley, 76 N.E.2d 438, 411 (Ill. 1997) ("We are
further guided by the well-established rule that equity does not favor forfeitures, and in

250

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

enforce any no-contest clause because the jurisdiction states that the
clause itself violates public policy. 59 Those jurisdictions consider any
restriction on the ability of an interested party to file a will contest to
violate public policy. 60 In order to ensure that wills admitted to probate
are authentic and genuine, those jurisdictions want any potential issue
to be brought to the attention of the relevant court.
Even when the jurisdiction will generally enforce a no-contest
clause, the jurisdiction will automatically enforce a particular clause
included in a testator's will. Many jurisdictions require the clause to
identify an alternate beneficiary for the forfeited testamentary gift. 61 A
jurisdiction may determine that, despite the language used in the
particular provision, the no-contest clause will not be triggered when a
beneficiary seeks a construction proceeding-even a construction
proceeding is to the interpretation of the no-contest clause itself. 62
Value exists to minimizing will contests. Will contests may rupture
family relationships, 63 erode the value of estate assets, 64 bog down the
administration process, tarnish memories, and taint legacies. The nocontest clause is one of many tools 65 that a testator and a drafter may
construing conditions, both precedent and subsequent, a reasonable construction must
be given in favor of the beneficiary.").
58.
E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 21304 ("[A] no-contest clause shall be strictly
construed.").
59.
For example, a Florida statute, titled "Penalty Clause for Contest,"
provides as follows: "A provision in a will purporting to penalize any interested person
for contesting the will or instituting other proceedings relating to the estate is
unenforceable." FLA. STAT. § 732.517 (2018).
60.
Jurisdictions may also be concerned that the no-contest clause will cause
additional litigation with litigation needed to consider the applicability and
enforceability of the clauses themselves.
61.
O.C. GA. § 53-4-68 (" A condition in terrorem shall be void unless there
is a direction in the will as to the disposition of the property if the condition in terrorem
is violated, in which event the direction in the will shall be carried out."). But cf N.Y.
§ 3-3.5(a) (McKinney 2018) (" A condition qualifying a disposition of property is
operative despite the failure of the testator to provide for an alternative gift to take
effect upon the breach or non-occurrence of such condition.").
62.
E.g., O.C. GA. § 9-4-4 (cited by In re Estate of Burkhalter, 806 S.E.2d
875, 878 (Ga. Ct. App. 2017)).
63.
E.g., Daniel Bent, My Bequest to My Heirs: Years of Contentious, Family
Splitting Litigation, HAw. B.J., Feb. 2004, at 29.
64.
E.g., In re Estate of Muller, 525 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (Sur. Ct. 1988)
(describing the aim of the no-contest clause as to "quickly and smoothly settle the
decedent's estate without fractious haggling and litigation and without wasting the estate
assets").
65.
Other drafting tools include using mediation and arbitration clauses. See
generally Stephen Wills Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration Clauses in Wills and Trusts:
A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. DISP. REsOL. 627 (2011); Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Reducing
Estate and Trust Litigation through Disclosure, In Terrorem Clauses, Mediation, and
Arbitration, 9 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT REsOL. 237 (2008); Lela P. Love & Stewart E.
Sterk, Leaving More Than Money: Mediation Clauses in Estate Planning Documents,
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consider to minimize the likelihood that a will contest will be filed and
that, if filed, minimize the likelihood that the will contest will alter the
testator's wishes.
The language in the no-contest clause aims to be comprehensive
and definitive with no equivocation.

B. Typical Structure Used
When including a no-contest clause, the clause is typically placed
near the end of the will, 66 nestled among the so-called boilerplate
language67 The structure used in no-contest clauses follow a typical
pattern. The clause does not specify a particular individual but directs
the clause to apply to "any beneficiary" or, even more broadly, to "any
person." The clause then lists a number of prohibited acts, those acts
that will trigger the forfeiture of individual's testamentary gift. The list
of prohibited acts is not limited simply to the filing of a will contest.
The clause then recites the consequences: the forfeiture of the gift. The
clause then recites how the forfeited gift will be distributed.
The following is a form no-contest clause from a contemporary
treatise:
If any beneficiary under this Will contests its validity or the
validity of any of its provisions, or institutes any proceeding
to prevent this Will or any of its provisions from being
carried out in accordance with its terms, whether or not in

/

65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 539 (2008); Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marins,
Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool to Prevent Contentious & Costly
Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PR.OP. PR.OB. & TR. J. 351
(2007); Yolanda Vorys, The Best of Both Worlds: The Use of Med-Arb for Resolving
Will Disputes, 22 Omo ST. J. DISP. REsol. 871 (2007). Roselyn L. Frieding, Using
Mediation to Stem the Tide of Litigation in the Ocean of Family Wealth Transfers, 59
DISP. REsoL. J. 36 (2004); Donald Gage, John Gromala, & Edward Kopf, Holistic
Estate Planning and Integrating Mediation in the Planning Process, 39 REAL PROP.
PR.OB. & TR. J. 509 (2004); Susan N. Gary, Mediation and the Elderly: Using
Mediation to Resolve Probate Disputes Over Guardianship and Inheritance, 32 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 397 (1997).
66.
No-contest clauses are not restricted to use in wills. The no-contest
clauses are being included in a range of trust instruments. See, e.g., Doolittle v.
Exchange Bank, 241 Cal. App. 4th 529 (2015); Rafalko v. Georgiadis, 77 S.E.2d 870
(Va. 2015); see also Duncan v. Rawls, 812 S.E.2d 674, 651-52 (Ga. Ct. App. 2018)
(interpreting no-contest clause statute referencing wills to also be applicable to trusts).
As part of an integrated estate plan, the no-contest clause may be included in both the
testator's will and the testator-settlor's lifetime trusts too. E.g., In re Estate of Walsh,
975 N. Y.S.2d 370 (Sur. Ct. 2013). For an analysis of no-contest clauses in trusts and a
proposal for the proper approach to approach no-contest clauses in trusts, see Deborah
S. Gordon, Forfeiting Trust, 51 WM. & MARYL. REV. 455 (2015).
67.
See, e.g., 10 NEW YORK FORMS LEGAL & Bus. § 24:116 Drafting will
(2018) (listing the no-contest clause as item 17 in 34 item checklist).
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good faith and with probable cause, then all benefits for such
beneficiary in this Will are revoked and annulled and the
benefits which such beneficiary would have received shall to
the residuary beneficiaries of this Will, other than such
contesting beneficiary. If all of the residuary beneficiaries join
in such a contest or proceeding, the residue of my estate shall
68
be disposed of as follows:

This two-sentence structure has long been a pattern for no-contest
' clauses. The fust sentence is 83 words and seeks to intimidate the
beneficiary from objecting to anything related to the will. The second
24 word sentence frame directs the disposition of the forfeited gift.
The modern no-contest clauses can be traced to language like the
following 19 word sentence: "No beneficiary hereunder who contests
this will or challenges any provision hereunder shall take any interest
under this will. "69
Still one sentence, the clause expanded to the following:
If any beneficiary under this Will shall in any way, directly or

indirectly, contest, object to, or hinder the probate of this
Will, or dispute any of its provisions, or exercise or attempt
to exercise, or give any notice with a view to exercising any
right to take any part or share of my estate otherwise than in
accordance with the provisions of this Will, or institute or
prosecute, or be in any way, directly or indirectly, interested
or instrumental in the institution or prosecution of, any action,
proceeding, contest or objection, or give any notice, for the
purpose of setting aside or invalidating this Will, or any of its
provisions or question in any manner the exercise by my
Executors of any discretionary power hereunder, or conspire
with or give aid to any person doing or attempting any of the
foregoing, then in each case all provisions for such
beneficiary and his or her descendants herein shall be void,
and my estate shall be disposed of as though such person had·
predeceased me leaving no descendants surviving me. 70
In addition to referencing additional circumstances, the language

may incorporate more overtly aggressive language, as in the following:

68.
RADFORD, supra note 4, at 298 (blank line in original). The first edition
of this book includes sample forms, but does not include a sample no-contest clause.
DANIEL REDFEARN WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA (1923).
69.
LEONARD LEVIN, A STUDENT'S GUIDE TO WILL DRAFTING 60 (1987).
70.
Provision from In re Estate of Robbins, 544 N.Y.S.2d 427, 428 (Sur. Ct.
1989).
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4.1 NON-CONTEST CLAUSE. If any beneficiary under this
Will, in any manner, directly or indirectly, contests or attacks
this Will or any of its provisions in any legal proceeding
designed to thwart my intentions as expressed in this Will,
any share or interest in my estate given to that contesting
beneficiary under this Will is hereby revoked and shall be
disposed of in the same manner provided herein as if that
contesting beneficiary had predeceased me without surviving
descendants. 71
The sameness of the language and sentence construction
demonstrates how boilerplate provisions are products of arguments
made in cases, interpretations made by courts, and commentary shared
by scholars and practitioners. While drafters should use arguments,
interpretations, and commentaries to evaluate testamentary language,
the mere tacking on of language and replication of so-called "timetested" language does not advance the purpose of the provision. The
phrasing coupled with the exceptions mean that "in terrorem clauses are
frequently reduced to empty threats. " 72
C. Appeal to Testators and Drafters

For a provision that has been called "a medieval hoax" 73 and "a
grotesque fiction, " 74 the no-contest clause continues to have enduring
appeal. No-contest clauses are considered, in the words of one court, to
"protect estates from costly, time consuming and vexatious litigation;
and serve to minimize family bickering concerning the competency and
capacity of the testator, as well as the amounts bequeathed, they are
favored by public policy. " 75 This language is mirrored by another court
by describing the benefits of a no-contest clause as "dissuad[ing]"
beneficiaries "'from filing vexatious litigation, particularly as among
family members, that might thwart the intent of the grantor' by making
the gifts under the instrument conditional on the beneficiaries not

71.
LWT of Sammy Davis, Jr. dated March 12, 1990 in HERBERT NESS,
WILLS OF RICH AND FAMOUS (Gramercy Books 1991).
72.
Ronald Z. Domsky, In Terrorem Clauses: More Bark Than Bite?, 25
LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 493, 494 (1994).
73.
Olin L. Browder, Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contest ReExamined, 49 COLO. L. REV. 320, 339 (1949).
74.
Olin L. Browder, Jr., Testamentary Conditions Against Contest, 36
MICH. L. REV. 1066, 1093 (1938).
75.
In re Estate of Simpson, 595 A.2d 94, 100 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (quoting
Matter of Estate of Westfahl, 674 F.2d 21, 23 (Okla. 1983)).
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challenging the validity of the instrument. " 76 Anecdotal evidence about
the power of no-contest clauses has yet to be verified by empirical
studies.
In part because of the lack of empirical support but also influenced
by critically interrogating the language, scholars and commentators
have encouraged reimagining of the language of no-contest clauses. For
example, one sample no-contest clause proposed by a scholar in 1965
suggested that the clause begin with the following sentence: "I earnestly
ask my beneficiaries, devisees and legatees, in harmony and in all
things, to aid my executor in carrying out my wishes as expressed in
this Will. " 77 The standardized form-based no-contest clause has
resisted, for the most part, such revisions.
The standard clause continues to appeal to both testators 78 and
drafters. As Professor Gerry Beyer summarized,

In terrorem provisions are one of the most frequently used
contest prevention techniques. This widespread use is
probably due to the technique's low cost (a few extra lines in
the will), low risk (no penalty incurred if a court declares the
clause unenforceable), and potential for effectuating the
testator's intent (property passing via the will rather than
through intestacy or under a prior will). 79
From the testator's perspective, 80 the phrasing of the standard nocontest clause sounds strong. The language is confident. The long
sentences and dense paragraph structure convey confidence as though
the language was refined and expanded upon thoughtfully through the
years. The litany of acts that may invoke the no-contest clause appears
to be comprehensive. The language is forceful. The consequences for
failing to comply sound dire. Yet, the language and structure may give
the testator a false confidence. The inclusion of the no-contest clause
provides no guarantees about the enforceability of the clause. The
76.
In re Estate of Boylan, No. 02-14-00170-CV, 2015 WL 598531 at *2
(Tex. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2015) (quoting Di Portanova v. Monroe, 402 S.W.3d 711, 715
(Tex. Ct. App. 2012)).
77.
Jack, supra note 25, at 736.
78.
See, e.g., Kenner, supra note 44, at 270 (attributing the increased use of
no-contest clauses to "demand among clients wishing wills prepared, that the attorney
insert some binding condition which will avert a future contest").
79.
Gerry W. Beyer, Will Contests-Prediction and Prevention, 4 EsT. PLAN.
& COMMUNITY. PROP. L.J. 1, 7 (2011).
80.
When Louisiana changed its forced heirship regime, one commentator
predicted that "[t]his increased freedom may prompt testators to resort to penalty
provisions as a guarantee that their wills are enforced." Irina Fox, Comment, Penalty
Clauses in Testaments: What Louisiana Can Learn from the Common Law, 70 LA. L.
REV. 1265, 1267 (2010).
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clause may not be enforceable in the scope envisioned by the testatoror even enforceable at all. The clause may not thus influence the
behavior of the beneficiaries.
Just as with the testator, the drafter may become over-confident
about the power of the clause because of the length and structure. The
repetition of no-contest clause language feeds into the myth of the timetested power of the language. The length suggests a continued evolution
that adapts and ultimately strengthens the power of the clause.
The drafter may also be reluctant to dismiss the potential benefits
afforded by the clause's inclusion. Even if those benefits are limited,
the clause may after all strike terror in the hearts of some beneficiaries
in some instances. Drafters are justifiably cautious with language in a
will. A will that is created today may not be submitted to the probate
court for fifty years or more. A will created today may be submitted to
the probate court one day after its execution. The language used has to
adapt to the changes in the testator's relationships-whether births,
deaths, marriages, or divorces-and changes in the testator's property.
For that reason, drafters do not want to alter the language on a hunch
about the possible negative reaction to the "standard" provision.
The inclusion of the clause may appear to incur no or low costs.
One more clause is included that may prevent the filing of a costly
contest. Characterizing the inclusion of the standard no-contest clause
as relatively low cost does not recognize the risks that such standard
language brings. The voice begins to be inauthentic and false. In other
words, not personal to the testator or not personal to the will's
beneficiaries. Those concerns include distancing testators from their
wills and prompting a will contest.
The mere presence of a no-contest clause may provoke will contest
by suggesting to the beneficiaries that the testator anticipated that a will
contest would indeed be filed. For that reason, no-contest clauses have
never been a fixture of every will. 81 Indeed, the advice from 1963
remains applicable today.
As for in terrorem clauses, I suggest they be used sparingly.
Their validity has been upheld but at times they seem to invite
a contest by arousing suspicions which might otherwise not
exist-and often there is available some heir (or legatee under

81.
Jack, supra note 25, at 737 ("The no-contest clause should not be
inserted in wills promiscuously or as a matter of form.").
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a prior will) with little at stake who is persuaded to serve as a
cat's-paw for the others. 82
D. Gendered Dimension to the Standard No-Contest Clause

The standard no-contest clauses may perpetuate gender
stereotypes. Language is not neutral. The users of language will find
identification with the language. 83 Historically, the language of the law
was masculine. 84
At the time the no-contest clauses were originally developed, a
testator was a white male owner of real property. 85 For the vast
majority of the history of the legal profession, lawyers were white
males. In statutes, cases, commentaries, and articles, use of the
gendered term "draftsman" and use of the masculine singular "he" to
refer to a testator were common. 86 In addressing the importance of
language in the law, one scholar in 1959 wrote, "While legal men of
various stripes have always been interested in language, particularly
legal language, even they do not until this quarter century seem to have

82.
Paul B. Sargent, Drafting of Wills and Estate Planning, 43 B.U. L. REv.
179, 198 (1963); see also Jack, supra note 25, at 739 ("In the final analysis the nocontest clause should be sparingly used and carefully phrased . . . ").
83.
E.g., Adam R. Chang & Stephanie M. Wildman, Gender In/Sight:
Examining Culture and Constructions of Gender, 18 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 43 (2017);
Hannah Arenstam, A Mother of a Problem: How the Language of Inequality Affects
Maternity Leave Policies and Women in Law Firms, 12 Nw. J.L. & Soc. PoL'Y 1
(2017).
84.
Karen J. Sneddon, Not Your Mother's Will: Gender, Language, and
Wills, 98 MARQ. L. REv. 1535 (2015); Matthew A. Ritter, The Penile Code: The
Gendered Nature of the Language of Law, 2 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 1 (1998). Vestiges of
the masculinity remain. See, e.g., Kristina M. Lagasee, Comment, Language, Gender,
and Louisiana Law: Removing Gender Bias from the Louisiana Civil Code, 64 LoY. L.
REV. 187, 187 (2018) (" Almost all of the 2,178 articles of the Louisiana Civil Codethe state's principal source of law-use solely masculine pronouns."). The Feminist
Judgments Projects are changing thoughts about feminist theory and judging. Bridget J.
Crawford, Kathryn M. Stanchi & Linda L. Berger, Feminist Judging Matters: How
Feminist Theory and Methods Affect the Process of Judgment, 47 U. BALT. L. REV. 167
(2018). The Trusts and Estates Volume of Feminist Judgments is forthcoming.
85.
The following sentences are a typical representation of a male-focused
testator. "The making of a will is one of the most solemn and consequential acts of a
man's life. Upon its legal and proper presentation depends the future happiness and
welfare of the persons and objects most dear to him." Kenner, supra note 44, at 269
(emphasis added).
86.
See, e.g., Leavitt, supra note 41, at 46 (using the term "draftsman").
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shown the conscious awareness of words as words." 87 Even today, the
legal profession continues to be dominated by males. 88
Gendered language continues to be used, and gender stereotypes
persist. The language 89 used reflects embedded bias. 90 For instance, in a
recent article encouraging estate planners to focus on the counseling
aspect of estate planning representation, the male lawyer-commentator
wrote the following: "However, the estate planner who focuses on the
transfer of property with minimum tax consequences is abdicating part
of his counseling responsibility to his client. " 91
The language of wills should reflect the diversity of today's
testators. 92 As Kathleen Dillon Narko wrote in 2017, "How we [as
lawyers] write reflects how society treats groups. " 93 Likewise, as Pat
K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelley-Chew wrote, "As lawyers, we
87.
Walter Probert, Law and Persuasion: The Language Behavior of
Lawyers, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 35, 35 (1959) (emphasis added).
88.
E.g., Lisa Kirby & Caren Ulrich Stacy, 'Hacldng' The Glass Ceiling in
Law Firms: Women's Hackathon Generates Business Innovations to Achieve Greater
Diversity, LAW PRAc. July/Aug. 2017, at 42, 43 ("Since 2000 the representation of
women equity partners in large law firms has increased a mere 2 percent . . . . "). For
statistics about women in all aspects of the legal profession, see Am. Bar Assoc.
Comm'n on Women in the Legal Profession, A Current Glance at Women in the Legal
Profession,
A.B.A,
(Jan.
2018),
https: //www.americanbar.org/ content/dam/ aba/ administrative/women/a-current-glanceat-women-in-the-law-jan-2018. pdf [https://perma.cc/G2D4-37YW]. Bias may be
continuing to hamper efforts of the legal community to reflect the diversity of the
general population. See, e.g., Christina Shu Jien Chong, Battling Biases: How Can
Diverse Students Overcome Test Bias on the Multistate Bar Examination, 18 U. Mo.
L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 31 (2018).
89.
Karen Busby, The Maleness of Legal Language, 18 MAN. L.J. 191, 192
(1989) (arguing that "grammatical features of the legal register such as pronouns,
generics, lexicon, semantics and syntax trivialize, exclude and devalue women and
characteristics associated with women"); see also MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE
DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW (1990); Lucinda M. Finley,
Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal
Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 886 (1989); Mary Ellen Griffith, Sexism,
Language, and the Law, 91 w. VA. L. REV. 125 (1988).
90.
For a discussion about gender stereotypes, the identity of the testator, and
the doctrine of undue influence, see Veena K. Murthy, Note, Undue Influence and
Gender Stereotypes: Legal Doctrine of Indoctrination, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 105
(1997).
91.
L. Paul Hood, Jr., The Human Side of Estate Planning Pan 1, TR. &
EST., July 2018, at 52, 52 (emphasis added).
92.
Language does change to reflect changes in society. See, e.g., Heidi K.
Brown, Inclusive Legal Writing: We Can Honor Good Grammar and Societal ChangeAt the Same Time, A.B.A. J. 22, Apr. 2018 at 22, 22 (exploring use of "they" as a
gender neutral singular pronoun); see also Pat K. Chew & Lauren K. Kelley-Chew,
Subtly Sexist Language, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 643, 643-44 (2007).
93.
Kathleen Dillon Narko, They and Ze: The Power of Pronouns, CHI. B.
Ass'N REc., Jan. 2017, at 48, 48; see also Greg Johnson, Welcome to Our GenderNeutral Future, VT. B.J., Fall 2016, at 36, 36-37.
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understand the power of words. What we say and how we say it can
perpetuate gender stereotypes and status differences between women
and men. In contrast, language also can be used as a constructive tool
for reinforcing equality. " 94 Posturing and bravado in the no-contest
clause represents false strength that alienates both male testators and
female testators. 95 Such language also alienates male beneficiaries and
female beneficiaries. This language also does not reflect the identity of
today's drafters, and the modem language of the law. 96
Ill.

CASE SPOTLIGHT-LIPPER V. WESLOW

When considering voice, strength, and no-contest clauses, scholars
and commentators will immediately think of one case: Lipper v.
Weslow. 97 The case has been consistently included in a number of trusts
and estates case books, 98 ensuring that law students, academics,
lawyers, and judges have read the case and will continue to be familiar
with the case. 99 The case of Lipper showcases the potential dangers
false strength, voice and no-contest clauses.

94.
Chew & Kelley-Chew, supra note 92, at 643-44.
95.
For a contemporary examination of the demographics of testacy, see
DiRusso, supra note 43 at 36.
%.
See, e.g., Susie Salmon, Reconstructing the Voice of Authority. 51 AKRON
L. REv. 143, 146 (2017) (positing "that many of the ways in which law schools teach
students how to be effective advocates also reinforce a paradigm of the male as the
archetypal "good lawyer," and that paradigm, in turn, feeds the implicit bias that
causes many of the inequalities and injustices in the legal profession"). But see Leslie
M. Rose, Teaching Gender as a Core Value in the Legal-Writing Classroom, 36 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 531 (2011) (sharing how to present gender issues to legal writing
students by avoiding gender stereotypes in assignments and using gender-inclusive
language).
97.
369 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963). The case is also notable for
exploring undue influence and the process by which undue influence is demonstrated.
See, e.g., GERRY w. BEYER, 10 Tux. PRAc., TEXAS LAW OF WILLS § 51:23 (4th ed.
2018); PENNELL & NEWMAN, supra note 29, at 55-56; see also Jacqueline Asadorian,
Note, Disinheritance of Minor Children: A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Probate
Code, 31 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 101, 118 (2011) (describing Lipper v. Weslow as "a
case where a court did not apply the doctrine despite the clear presence of traditional
indicia of undue influence").
98.
See, e.g., ALFRED L. BROPHY, DEBORAH GoRDON, NORMAN P. STEIN, &
CARYL YZENBAARD, EXPERIENCING TRUSTS & EsTATES 359-65 (West Publishing Group
2017); ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND EsTATES 2%301 (Wolters Kluwer 10th ed. 2017); ROGER w. ANDERSEN & IRA MARK BLOOM,
FuNDAMENTALS OF TRUSTS AND EsTATES 145 (4th ed. 2012).
99.
The case has long been featured in the popular trusts and estates casebook
originally authored by Jesse Dukeminier and Stanley Johanson. JESSE DUKEMINIER, JR.,
& STANLEY M. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH TRANSACTIONS: WILLS, TRUSTS, FuTURE
INTERESTS, AND EsTATE PLANNING 591-98 (Little, Brown & Co. 1972).
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The testator was named Sophie Block. 100 Sophie had been married
three times and had three children from two of the marriages. 101 One of
her children, named Julian, predeceased her. 102 Sophie did not have a
close relationship with Julian's widow and their children. 103 Sophie did,
however, have close relationships with her other two children,
especially her son Frank Lipper who lived next door and had a key to
Sophie's house. 104 When Sophie, aged eighty-one decided to create a
will, she asked a lawyer she knew to help her: her son Frank. 105
When drafting the will, Frank anticipated that a will contest might
be filed. 106 This anticipation was grounded in several facts. Frank was
one of the beneficiaries and named the personal representative. 107
Julian's three children were not provided for in the will. 108 Frank did
not have a positive relationship with Julian during Julian's lifetime and
did not appear to have a relationship with Julian's three children. 109 The
applicable intestate scheme would have given Julian's share to his
children by representation. 110
Sophie, although living independently and physically active until
the date of her death, was of an advanced age. 111 Frank undertook
various planning techniques. The will included a no-contest clause and
a statement of reasons for the disinheritance of Julian's three
children. 112 The witnesses were not interested, but were two former
business associates of Sophie's third husband. 113 Despite these
precautions, the will was not read by or to Sophie before she signed the
will. 114

100.
Lipper, 369 S.W.2d at 699.
101.
Id.
102.
Id. at 699-700
103.
Id. at 700-01
104.
Id. at 701.
105.
Id. at 702. Frank was actually named as the Independent Executor, a
designation that is recognized in Texas. Id. at 699; TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. §
3(q)(1956). This designation authorizes less court supervision of the acts of the
fiduciary. See generally M.K. WOODWARD & ERNEST E. SMITH, III, 17 TEX. PRAcr.
PROB. & DECEDENTS' EsTATES, § Appointment of Independent Executor (supplement by
Gerry W. Beyer).
106.
See Lipper, 369 S.W.2d at 700-01.
107.
Id. at 699, 701-02; see TEX. PROB. CODE ANN§ 3(q), (aa) (1956).
108.
Lipper, 369 S.W.2d at 699.
109.
See id. at 700-01.
110.
See id. at 699-701, 703.
111.
Id. at 701-02.
112.
Id. at 700.
113.
See id. at 699.
114.
Id. at 701.
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Twenty-two days after the execution of the will, Sophie died. 115
Sophie was survived by her third husband Max Block, her daughter
Irene, her son Frank, the widow of her son Julian, and Julian's three
children. 116 Julian's three children filed a will contest on the grounds of
undue influence. 117
The will included 10 sections, not including the introduction and
the conclusion. 118 The language of the no-contest clause is not a
memorable aspect of the case because the clause itself is not quoted in
the case. 119 The no-contest clause had no deterrent effect because
Julian's three children were not given any gift under the terms of the
will. 12° Clause 9, which is a statement of reasons for the disinheritance,
is what most recall about the case. 121
Despite the recall that people have of this case, Lipper is not a
good example of an effective use of voice or a no-contest clause.
Instead, Lipper is an example of the dangers of an inauthentic voice and
an ineffective no-contest clause. Clause 9 is a recitation of misdeeds
and hurt caused by Sophie's daughter-in-law and the three children. 122
The clause is almost 760 words with dense sentences that are strung
together with commas. 123 The first sentence alone is 129 words. 124 In
addition to reciting factually inaccurate information, the clause relies
upon overtly aggressive language. For example, the clause proclaims
that
I want to go into sufficient detail in explaining my relationship
in past years with my said son's widow and his children ...
it is my desire to record such relationship so that there will be
no question as to my feelings in the matter . . . . 125
Her son's widow is described as "unfriendly" and "distant. " 126 The text
is also whiny and judgmental, as demonstrated with the following
language "my life would have been much happier if they [Julian's
widow and his three children] had shown a disposition to want to be a

115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 699.
117.
Id.
118.
Id. at 699-701.
119.
Id. at 700.
120.
Id. at 699.
121.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. S!TKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER,
ESTATES 302-04 (10th ed. 2017).
122.
Lipper, 369 S.W. 2d at 700-01.
123.
Id.
124.
Id. at 700.
125.
Id.
126.
See id.
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part of the family and enter into a normal family relationship that
usually exists with a daughter-in-law and grandchildren and great
grandchildren. " 127 The clause is full of legalese. For instance, the
words "such" and "said" are used extensively throughout the clause as
pointing words. 128 The text is stilted and bears little resemblance to
spoken speech.
Despite the worthless no-contest clause and the problematic
statement of reasons, the will contest was ultimately not successful. 129
The last will of Sophie Block was admitted to probate. 130 The appellate
court stated that the testator will was "unnatural" because the difference
between the dispositive scheme and the intestate scheme. 131 The
appellate court also stated that Sophie "had a right to do as she did,
whether we [the appellate court] think she was justified or not. " 132 The
language used in both Clause 8 and Clause 9 might have, instead of
discouraging a will contest, actually encouraged the will contest. The
false strength of Clause 9 represents the exact concern of the standard
no-contest clause language.
VI. SURVEY OF CASES FROM 2012-17
The case of Lipper v. Weslow is not an idiosyncratic case in either
its facts or its attempt to assume strength through aggressive,
judgmental testamentary language. Likewise, the case of Lipper v.
Weslow is not outdated in its use of the hollow no-contest clause
language. To determine whether "time-tested" language continues to be
used in modem no-contest clauses, a survey of recent cases was
undertaken. A survey of state cases for a five year period from 2012 to
2017 revealed twenty-one cases from across the country examining the
enforceability of no-contest clauses in wills. 133 A number of these cases

127.
Id.
128.
"Such and said are perhaps the most commonly misused words in legal
writing." Marie Antoinette Moore, Such and Said, This and That, 29 PROB. & PROP.,
Sept./Oct. 2015, at 64.
129. Lipper, 369 S.W.2d at 703.
130.
Id.
131.
Id.
132.
Id. After the will's execution and in response to a comment by a
neighbor, Sophie stated that she "would have those wills fixed up so there would be no
court business." Id. at 701. Sophie also stated that she would not "leave them [Julian's
three children] a dime." Id.
133.
The survey does not include review of cases that exclusively evaluating
no-contest clauses included in inter vivos trusts. E.g., In re ATS /998 Trust, 403 P.3d
684 (Nev. 2017) (unpublished table disposition). Likewise, the survey does not include
cases where the will included a no-contest clause but the applicability or enforceability
of the no-contest clause was not an issue. E.g., In re Last Will and Testament of Lubin,
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are designated unreported dispositions 134 or unpublished opinions. 135
These cases included wills that were executed from 1992 to 2013,
which is a reminder that a will drafted years ago will be interpreted
with modem eyes in the probate proceedings.
An odd situation arises when reviewing no-contest clauses that
appear in reported cases. The existence of the case represents a failure
of the no-contest clause. A will contest has been filed. 136 The most
effective examples of no-contest clauses may then be excluded from a
review of court opinions. Nevertheless, the review of cases can inform
drafting decisions.
In the vast majority of these cases, the no-contest clauses did not
result in the forfeiture of a testamentary gift. 137 These clauses did not
operate as intended for several reasons. Those reasons included
recognizing the applicability of the good-faith-probable-cause
exception 138 and classifying the actions of the beneficiary as not
triggering the clause. 139 Ineffective use of the clause continues when the
no-contest clause is included, but the heirs who are contesting are not
given a testamentary gift. 140
A typical clause from the reviewed cases reads as follows:
In the event that any person shall contest this Will or attempt
to establish that he or she is entitled to any portion of my
estate or to any right as an heir, other than as herein
provided, I hereby give and bequeath unto any such person
the sum of one dollar. 141

975 N.Y.S.2d 366 (Sur. Ct. 2013) (unreported table disposition) (considering preanswer motion to dismiss and noting that the will included a no-contest clause).
134.
E.g., In re Estate of Carpenter, 410 P.3d 951, 2017 WL 6617077 (2017)
(unpublished table disposition) (enforcing the no-contest clause); In re Estate of
Sochurek, 41 N.Y.S.3d 452 (Sur. Ct. 2016) (unreported disposition) (enforcing the nocontest clause and finding that the challengers "have forfeited their legacies").
135.
E.g., Sinnott v. Sinnott, 88 Mass. App. Ct. 1119 (2016) (unpublished
table opinion); In re Estate of Alexander, 2015 IL. App. (4th) 141096-U (unpublished
opinion).
136.
E.g., Pfaltz, Jr., supra note 41, at 780 ("In those cases where a contest
arises in spite of the existence of an in te"orem provision, the clause has failed to fulfill
its function, and it may matter little that the clause is inconsistently applied, at least for
the estate involved.").
137.
E.g., Parker v. Benoist, 160 So. 3d 198, 207-09 (Miss. 2015); In re
Estate of Boylan, No. 02-14-00170-CV, 2015 WL 598531 at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Feb.
12, 2015).
138.
E.g., Parker v. Benoist, 160 So. 3d 198, 207-09 (Miss. 2015).
139.
E.g., In re Estate of Dayan, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 721 (Ct. App. 2016).
140.
E.g., Cresto v. Cresto, 358 P.3d 831, 845-46 (Kan. 2015).
141.
In re Estate of Primani, 198 Wash. App. 1067, (2017) (unpublished
opinion) (remanding for proceedings to determine whether the filed will contest was
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The generic "any person" 142 and "any beneficiary" 143 were used.
The prohibited list of acts included not only filing a will contest but any
attempt "or oppose or seek to set aside" 144 the will. Forceful language
was used to describe the actions of the beneficiaries, including
"attacks, " 145 "impair" 146 and "interfere. " 147 The bland term
"establish" 148 was also used. These actions could occur in a court or
"any tribunal. " 149 The consequence of the clause ranged from a
direction to distribute the property to the residuary beneficiary 150 to
distribute the property "as if that contesting beneficiary had not
survived me. " 151 The more aggressive direction dictated that the
forfeited property was to be "distribute[d] as if the contesting
beneficiary predeceased me without any living descendants. " 152
One case was notable because the case included a no-contest clause
using voice as a technique to influence the beneficiaries. 153 The clause
reads as follows:
It is my expressed desire and intent to have the provisions of
this my Last Will and Testament administered without
objection by any of my named beneficiaries. I have given this
Will a great deal of thought and firmly believe the provisions
set forth herein are fair and equitable to all beneficiaries. In
the event any beneficiary shall legally challenge this Will,
making any claim against the estate or attempt to partition the

made in good faith). Not all of the court opinions quote the no-contest clause. E.g., In
re Estate of Santi, No. A-4524-10T4, 2013 WL 375575 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.).
142.
Estate of Primani, 198 Wash. App. 1067.
143.
In re Estate of Fisher, No. 2778 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11255631, at *1
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (non-precedential decision).
144.
In re Estate of Landon, No. 5230-MZ, 2017 WL 2492044, at *1 (Del.
Ch.) (unpublished opinion).
145.
In re Estate of Dayan, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712, 715 (Ct. App. 2016).
146.
In re Estate of Peters, 17 N.Y.S.3d 805, 805 (Sup. Ct. 2015).
147.
In re Estate of Sochurek, 52 Misc. 3d 1204(A) (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2016)
(unreported disposition).
148.
Estate of Primani, 198 Wash. App. 1067.
149.
E.g., In re Estate of Mahoney, 347 P.3d 1214 (Kan. Ct. App. 2015)
(unpublished disposition).
150.
See, e.g., Parker v. Benoist, 160 So. 3d 198 (Miss. 2015).
151.
In re Span Estate, 2016 WL 520009, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016)
(unpublished opinion).
152.
In re Estate of Fisher, No. 2778 EDA 2012, 2013 WL 11255631, at *1
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (non-precedential decision).
153.
Gleason v. Korde, 856 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (decision
without published opinion).
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real estate, then that beneficiary's share shall be forfeited and
distributed to the other named beneficiaries. 154

The Iowa Court of Appeals ultimately did not address the
enforceability of the clause because the filed dispute was about the
petition to partition the real property subsequent to the closing of the
estate. 155 The language quoted above appeals to the beneficiaries to
respect the terms. Rather than provoking an aggressive response to
object to the terms, this language attempts to inspire acceptance and
respect for the terms.
These court opinions evidence that no-contest clauses are still
being included in wills written in this century. These clauses continue
to have appeal. The reviewed clauses have limited customization-with
one notable exception.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TESTAMENTARY LANGUAGE

Evaluating and understanding the power and dangers of the nocontest clauses has broader implications for testamentary language.
Wills are full of self-referencing. The will begins and ends with the
singular first person "I" and the personal pronoun "me." The will also
includes numerous use of the possessive pronouns "mine" and "my."
Others will refer to the will by using the possessive pronouns "her" and
"his." Nonetheless, the language of the will reflects little of the
testator's voice. The voice of the will needs to avoid ambiguity and
does need to maintain a certain amount of formality as a formal legal
document. Yet, in aiming for strength, the voice of the will can become
bland, generic, and false. This is demonstrated by the false strength of
the generic no-contest clause.
Despite concerns expressed about the dangers of no-contest clauses
to provoke a will contest or have limited effectiveness in preventing the
filing of a successful will contest, no-contests clauses continue to be
used in wills. 156 Indeed, the use of no-contests clauses has expanded
into new documents, specifically trust instruments. 157 The use may be
attributed to a number of reasons, but these reasons raise implications
about perpetuating stereotypes and discouraging drafting innovation.
Both concerns are not limited to the analysis of no-contest clauses.
Wills drafted today may not be submitted to a probate court for
fifty years or more. Declaring any provision, including a no-contest

154.
Id.
155.
Id.
156.
See, e.g., Dawn Koren, No-Contest Clauses: Settlement Offers from the
Grave, 12 PROB. L.J. 173, 173 (1995).
157.
See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 66, at 484-505.
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clause, to have no value in any situation would be an overstatement. In
the case of no-contest clauses, it is impossible to determine with any
degree of certainty how many no-contest clauses are used that prevent a
contest from being filed. 158 If no contest has been filed, no paper trail
exists. The cases involving the enforceability of the no-contest clauses
evidence that the clause did not in fact prevent the filing of a will
contest. But some of those clauses are indeed enforceable and do indeed
effectuate the expressed intent of the testator to have a contesting
beneficiary forfeit his or her share. 159
Testamentary language has proven to be "sticky." Provisions
continue to be used as a result of audience expectation and concern that
eliminating provisions creates unintended consequences. 160 "If it ain't
broke" can be a convenient excuse that inhibits drafting innovation. 161
This reluctance might also be a perception that courts are comfortable
with interpreting the standard language. But a 2017 California court
refutes this sentiment with the following statement: "Generic nocontests clauses, which is what we have here, are obsolete. " 162
Including standard provisions may actually create risks. In the use
of no-contest clauses, the one sentence may inspire a false confidence
of standard that prevents the consideration of other more effective
planning techniques. The language assumes a posturing tone that further
distances testators from their most personal of legal documents. 163 This
distance can also encourage the testator's family, beneficiaries, personal
158.
Id. ("To a large extent, any data on the frequency with which no-contest
clauses are used is purely conjectural, as most uses have not come within the purview
of their judicial system.").
159.
Wilson v. Dallas, 743 S.E.2d 746, 762 (S.C. 2013) (stating that James
Brown's inclusion of the no-contest clause in both his will and his trust is "[a]nother
strong indicator of Brown's intent" as to the dispositive scheme).
160.
See, e.g., Kenneth A. Adams, Dysfunction in Contract Drafting: The
Causes and a Cure, 15 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 317, 323, 327 (2014) (noting
that over-confidence may be produced when the drafter relies upon previously drafted
documents or form documents); Larry E. Ribstein, Sticky Forms, Property Rights, and
Law, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 65, 68 (2011) ("One reason for not changing a contract
clause that has stopped making sense is that the costs of change outweigh the
benefits."); see also Robert E. Shapiro, Do Lawyers Think about What They 're Doing?,
41 LITIG. 59, 60 (2015) ("These provisions have now become routine, done because
always done.").
161.
E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Contract
and Innovation: The Limited Role of Generalist Courts in the Evolution of Novel
Contractual Forms, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 170, 190-91 (2013) (exploring the role that
courts can play in promoting and hindering contract innovation).
162.
Aviles v. Swearingen, 224 Cal. Rptr. 3d 686, n.4 (Ct. App. 2017) (urging
"particularity" in the drafting of no-contest clauses). This statement could be extended
to generic testamentary language.
163.
This is especially true for those who might be considered outsiders to the
law or groups who have been historically marginalized in the law. See discussion supra
Part 11.C.
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representative, and even the court to project an alternate interpretation
of the words. 164
Scholars and commentators have urged the customization of
testamentary language, including the language of no-contest clauses. 165
One scholar in 1963 stated that "[t]he particular language used to
achieve compliance with the testator's wishes naturally varies from will
to will, according to the style of the individual drafts[person]. " 166 This
variation may be a reflection of the goals and needs of testators. More
recently, a commentator states that "testators can be extremely creative
in their phraseology . . . . " 167 But that has not been the case with nocontest clauses, certainly not the no-contest clauses that appear in
modem cases. The clauses used most commonly today appear to be
generic replications of stock language. 168
Varying so-called standard drafting practices raises the concern of
increasing the transaction costs. Customizing documents need not to be
expensive. Providing detailed client intake questionnaires can minimize
the time that is needed to gather sufficient facts to customize the
provision. Document automation can still occur with new provisions
that can be added to the provision bank.
The generic no-contest clause also perpetuates gender stereotypes
by equating strong language with forcefulness. The off-the-cuff
dismissal of expressive language is an example of language that is
discouraged because the language deviates from the "standard" will
language. Expressive language is only one example of "non-standard"
language. Other examples include altering the order of provisions and
providing expanded descriptions of tangible personal property.
Personalization can further the goals of the particular legal instrument.
This Article does not advocate that no-contest clauses should never
be used in wills. Instead, this Article asserts that thoughtful drafting is
critical. The standard no-contest clause should not be seen as a low risk
technique to prevent the filing of a will contest. Where including the
no-contest clause in particular wills, the language of the standard nocontest clauses should be altered to reflect the voice of the testator. To
begin, the clause should not include overtly aggressive phrasing. Care

164.
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
165.
Jack Challis, In Te"orem Clauses: Avoiding Will Contests and
Disinheritance (with Sample Provisions), 17 ALI-ABAEsT. PLAN. CONCISE MATERIALS
J. 35, 42 (June 2011) (emphasizing the need to customize use and language of the
clause for each particular testator).
166.
Leavitt, supra note 41, at 46.
167.
Fox, supra note 80, at 1266.
168.
See supra note 160 and accompanying text. Customized no-contest
clauses may be so successful that no will contest is filed. Thus, no court cases quoting
such customized language can be found.
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should be taken to avoid "the use of extreme or bitter words." 169 The
bitterness can be evidenced by use of "attack" rather than "object."
The aggressive language is an example of false strength and false voice.
The language and tone could be moderated. 170 The clause should instead
be prefaced with the following language: "While I anticipate only an
amicable administration of my estate, I . . . . " 171 Another option for
framing the clause is as follows: "I earnestly ask my beneficiaries,
devises and legatees in harmony and in all things, to aid my executor in
carrying out my wishes as expressed in this Will. In order to insure
. 1s
. my Will , and I .... " 172
thi s, 1t
The will is both a legal document and a personal document. Yet,
all too often the testator, the testator's family, the testator's
beneficiaries, and the testator's personal representatives do not see the
connection between the person and the language.
CONCLUSION

When a testator makes a will, the testator wants his or her wishes
to be respected. How to ensure that the testator's wishes are respected
after the testator dies presents a conundrum for both testators and
drafters. Voice presents the opportunity for the testator to speak
directly to the testator's beneficiaries, family members, personal
representative, and, ultimately the court. The issue of how to achieve a
strong voice is highlighted by examining the no-contest clause where
the distinction between compelling language and bullying language can
become blurred. Testators and drafters have long abandoned the
threatening language of in terrorem clauses that proclaims, "[h]e who
wishes to alter this will, unless it be I myself, may God destroy him
now and on the Day of Judgment." 173 The replacement language has not
been as successful as it might otherwise be. The language of a standard
no-contest clause aims to be comprehensive and definitive by
referencing "any person" and itemizing a litany of prohibited acts. The
words "thwart" and "attack" are replicated from clause to clause. The
provision becomes dense, and the voice becomes generic. Rather than
showcasing strength, the voice resonates as hollow. Replicating
aggressive language that thunders threats may not only inspire the filing

169.
Jaworski, supra note 18, at 90.
170. E.g., SUSAN BRODY ET AL., LEGAL DRAFTING 138 (Aspen 1994)
(suggesting to the testator that "[y]ou may deflect some hostility by softening the tone
of your documents").
171.
RALPH R. NEUHOFF, STANDARDS CLAUSES ARE WILLS 72.7 (3d ed. 1962).
172.
Jack, supra note 25, at 736.
173.
WHITELOCK, supra note 34, at 83 (Will of Thurstan).
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of a will contest but also hinder drafting innovation and customization
of the will' s language to reflect the particular testator.
This examination of no-contest clauses has been undertaken not
exclusively to advocate for the limited use of generic no-contest
clauses. Rather, this examination has been undertaken to explore the
power of "time-tested" language and the lasting appeal of such
formulaic testamentary language. This Article does not suggest that all
form-based testamentary language should be eradicated from the will.
Instead, this Article urges a willingness to consider new approaches to
testamentary language that focus on the individual voice of the testator.

